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1. Political Neuroscience 
The field of political science has traditionally had close ties 
to disciplines like economics, history, and sociology. While 
political science has always been somewhat interdisciplinary 
in nature, in recent years this interdisciplinary approach has 
expanded to include biology, psychology, and neuroscience. 
This interest in the human sciences has led to the devel-
opment of new subfields within political science, including 
biopolitics, political psychology, and political neuroscience 
(also called neuropolitics). What these new subfields have 
in common is an interest in individual human behavior and 
decision-making as an approach to understanding political 
behavior. While political science has traditionally focused on 
understanding politics in the aggregate, new methods and 
techniques are improving our ability to understand political 
behavior at the individual level and consider how individual 
differences in information processing may give rise to polit-
ical behavior that is observed at the mass level. 
While political science, psychology, and neuroscience 
have fairly distinct intellectual histories, it makes sense to 
combine them. While some political scientists think about 
politics as a special type of human behavior, and some psy-
chologists dismiss the study of politics as too applied, a case 
can be made for the idea that politics and psychology share 
significant overlap. From the perspective of human evolu-
tion and the development of social behavior, it seems clear 
that social and political behavior have been historically in-
tertwined.1,2 Just as the brain evolved to deal with larger 
and larger social groups, it became necessary to consider 
how those groups should be governed. From this perspec-
tive, it seems obvious to suggest that political behavior can 
be understood through the lens of human psychology, bi-
ology, and neuroscience. 
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As with any interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary ap-
proach, there are a number of challenges for researchers 
working in this area. While it has become increasingly clear 
that recent advances in social and cognitive neuroscience 
will help improve our understanding of political behavior, 
there are significant challenges that arise when trying to 
engage in this type of multilevel analysis—it is not always 
easy to translate what happens at the neural level into much 
more abstract notions about how society functions. 
In this chapter, I will outline the contributions that po-
litical neuroscience has made thus far and discuss areas 
where political neuroscience may have the most to contrib-
ute moving forward. The chapter will focus on four impor-
tant questions within political psychology and discuss the 
role for neuroimaging work within these areas: (1) political 
attitudes and evaluation, (2) social cognition and politics, 
(3) emotion and politics, and (4) individual differences in 
political behavior. Given that political neuroscience is in its 
infancy, the discussion of work in this area will be supple-
mented with relevant work from social and cognitive neu-
roscience, as well as social and political psychology more 
broadly. I think political scientists and neuroscientists can 
benefit from firmly grounding their ideas in social psycho-
logical theory, and social psychologists can benefit from an 
increasing understanding of brain function, as well as in-
creased consideration of the role of context. After review-
ing the current state of the literature in political neurosci-
ence, I will offer some suggestions for future work. 
2. A Brief Overview of Neuroimaging 
Methods 
Many of the chapters in this volume will no doubt dis-
cuss neuroimaging methodology in extensive detail, but 
it is worth providing a brief overview here of neuroimag-
ing methods used by political neuroscientists, especially for 
those readers who may be new to the field. The growth of 
methods like fMRI has been exponential since 1990.3 The 
use of these methods to study questions in political neu-
roscience has followed suit, although I think it is fair to say 
that political neuroscience is not quite as well established at 
this point. It is still possible to create a (relatively short) list 
of all the political neuroscience studies that have been con-
ducted with structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) 
or functional neuroimaging (fMRI) or electroencephalog-
raphy (EEG). 
There have been multiple attempts to describe how po-
litical science and cognitive neuroscience might be able to 
learn from one another, perhaps dating back to a special is-
sue of the journal Political Psychology published in 2003.4-6 
Although acceptance of this idea has grown, some political 
scientists remain skeptical of the idea that adopting neuro-
imaging methods will strengthen the field. More recently, 
people have called for balance on this issue—it is important 
to not overstate the claims we can make based on methods 
like functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) but also 
important not to be overly dismissive and to be aware that 
this field is still in its infancy.7 These methods are unlikely to 
replace traditional methods in political science research, but 
they may be used by some political scientists (through ad-
ditional training or through collaboration) to help supple-
ment our understanding of important questions in the field. 
Given that this volume is focused on the role of neuro-
imaging, my goal here is to discuss neuroimaging research 
as it relates to political science. With that in mind, I will fo-
cus primarily on research using structural and functional 
imaging. It is important to note that a lot of research in the 
domain of biopolitics has also begun to investigate these 
issues using methods from psychophysiology, but that is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. For readers who are less 
familiar with these methods, I will offer a brief overview be-
low. It is important to be aware that different methods have 
different strengths and weaknesses, and may be amenable 
to different types of research questions. 
2.1 Structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) is a technology that al-
lows researchers to take three-dimensional images of the 
brain. This technology allows for much more detailed reso-
lution than older imaging technologies like X-ray, CT scan, 
or positron emission technology (PET) scan. For example, a 
3 Tesla MRI can produce a three-dimensional image of the 
brain at a resolution of 1×1×1 mm. Structural MRI can be 
used to examine and compare the size and composition of 
different subregions within the brain across individuals. In 
relation to politics, this technique is most useful for indi-
vidual difference analyses where different brain regions or 
structures are compared across individuals as a function of 
some personality trait or characteristic. There are additional 
methods available for structural imaging, such as diffusion 
tensor imaging (DTI), which allows for measurement of an-
atomical connections between brain regions. To my knowl-
edge, no studies have used DTI yet to study political differ-
ences so I will not discuss that here. 
2.2 Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
Magnetic resonance imaging can also be used for research 
on brain function. This type of research uses a different 
strategy for image collection. While structural imaging pro-
duces high-resolution images of the brain, functional imag-
ing typically produces lower resolution images focused not 
on structure, but on changes in brain function as a prod-
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uct of some experimental task. It is important to realize that 
fMRI relies on indirect measurement of brain activation.8,9 
This measurement of brain function is dependent on what 
is known as the blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) sig-
nal. The basic assumption of fMRI is that measurement of 
increased cerebral blood flow using the BOLD signal can 
serve as a proxy for increased neural activity. While this idea 
is relatively well-established at this point, questions remain 
about exactly what the BOLD response represents. Neu-
roscientists have argued that the BOLD response is more 
closely tied to input and processing within a brain region 
and less related to output or “spiking” from that region.8,9 
There are some important caveats to be aware of re-
lated to the interpretation of fMRI data. First, any signal 
produced is a relative (not absolute) measure of activation. 
As you will see in the description of political neuroscience 
work in the sections that follow, typically any results from 
an fMRI study are discussed in terms of contrast effects 
(i.e., observing greater activation for one condition com-
pared to a baseline, control, or second experimental con-
dition). Second, analysis of fMRI data is highly dependent 
on assumptions about the BOLD signal-data is typically an-
alyzed using the hemodynamic response function (HRF), 
which assumes that the BOLD signal peaks about four to 
six seconds after stimulus presentation and then returns 
to baseline.9 Finally, fMRI data is correlational—you can 
show support for a relationship between BOLD activation 
and stimuli or task demands, but it is difficult to establish 
causal relationships. Simply showing that brain activation 
is related to some task does not establish that region is 
necessary for the task, and researchers who study social 
or political behavior need to be aware that some of the 
brain activation they observe may be due to basic cogni-
tive processes (e.g., viewing a stimulus, task switching de-
mands). Careful experimental design can help ameliorate 
some of these concerns related to interpretation, but it is 
worth being cautious when interpreting fMRI data. 
2.3 Electroencephalography 
There is an often discussed trade-off when discussing fMRI 
versus electroencephalography (EEG) and other neuroim-
aging methods. While fMRI provides superior spatial res-
olution, EEG provides superior temporal resolution. This is 
sometimes mistaken to mean that fMRI provides no infor-
mation about timecourse, which is not exactly true. Data 
from fMRI allow for examination of the timecourse on a 
slower scale—in terms of seconds as opposed to millisec-
onds with EEG. It is also important to realize that EEG and 
fMRI are not measuring the same thing—EEG measures 
electrical activity, whereas fMRI is dependent on the BOLD 
signal, as discussed above. 
The primary strength of EEG is its ability to measure elec-
trophysiological responses in a matter of milliseconds. EEG 
uses a net of electrodes that is placed on the scalp and 
measures surface-level electrical activity. The primary diffi-
culty with EEG is determining where those electrical signals 
are coming from. Although methods for source localiza-
tion have become significantly more refined over the years, 
the spatial resolution from EEG cannot compete with spa-
tial resolution obtained through fMRI and it can be difficult 
to obtain a signal from subcortical regions (e.g., amygdala) 
using EEG. Most of the work in political neuroscience that I 
will discuss in this chapter has used structural or functional 
MRI, but there have also. been some studies in this area us-
ing EEG, which I will describe below. 
3. Important Questions in Political 
Neuroscience 
In the sections that follow, I will provide an overview of po-
litical neuroscience research related to four important ques-
tions within political psychology: (1) how do people evaluate 
political information?, (2) how do people think about and 
process politically similar and dissimilar others?, (3) what is 
the impact of emotion on politics?, and (4) how do individ-
ual differences influence political thought and behavior? 
For each section, I will provide an overview of the relevant 
research in political neuroscience, placing this work in the 
context of social and political psychology, as well as social 
and cognitive neuroscience. The existing work in political 
neuroscience becomes easier to interpret if it is placed in 
context, and a broader understanding of research in these 
related fields may help to illustrate gaps in the existing work 
and help generate ideas for future research. 
4. Political Attitudes and Evaluation 
Social psychologists have been interested in the properties 
of attitude structure, function, and change for quite some 
time. Traditional work in this area has relied most heavily 
on self-reported attitudes, using measurement tools such 
as Likert scales or semantic differentials, and these were 
among the first measurement tools to be adopted by po-
litical scientists interested in studying attitudes. More re-
cently, there has been a burgeoning interest in implicit or 
indirect attitude measurement, typically relying on cogni-
tive response latency measures such as the Implicit Associ-
ation Test (IAT)10 or the Affective Misattribution Procedure 
(AMP).11,12 Along with these shifts in methodology have 
been related shifts in attitude theory. Given that we now 
have two different categories of measurement techniques, 
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researchers have speculated about what these two types of 
measures may represent. 
In recent years, there has been a lot of debate within so-
cial psychology regarding what are known as dual process-
ing and dual systems models of attitudes. Without getting 
too carried away with the details here, researchers have ar-
gued back and forth about whether we should consider 
implicit and explicit attitudes to be two different types of 
attitudes (presumably existing as two different types of at-
titudes stored in the brain or related, to different types of 
memory or processing)13-15 versus a focus on implicit and 
explicit measures tapping into the same attitudinal informa-
tion (but sometimes producing different “attitudes” at least 
in terms of measurement outcome).16,17 This debate over 
dual system versus dual process models of attitudes can po-
tentially be informed by greater understanding of the neu-
ral underpinnings of evaluation. 
In recent years, social cognitive neuroscience has 
weighed in on this question by suggesting that we should 
focus not on different types of attitudes per se, but on the 
process of evaluation. In a recent model of attitudes and 
evaluation informed by neurobiology, the Iterative Repro-
cessing (IR) Model, Cunningham and Zelazo proposed that 
the process of evaluation should be understood as unfold-
ing over time.6,18 Attitudinal information is stored in mem-
ory and accessed as needed to provide evaluations relevant 
to the current situation or context. This process is iterative, 
meaning that attitudes can be updated as new information 
is received externally or additional information is accessed 
internally. So, different “attitudes” may result from implicit 
versus explicit measures capturing the current evaluation at 
different time points or after varying degrees of information 
processing, updating, and reorganization. 
The IR Model proposes a network of brain regions that 
are likely implicated in the process of evaluation, including 
subcortical regions like the amygdala, insula, and hypothal-
amus, regions that allow for additional processing, like the 
anterior cingulate and orbitofrontal cortex, as well as re-
gions likely involved in higher-order processing, such as ar-
eas of prefrontal cortex (PFC—dorsolateral PFC, ventrolat-
eral PFC, and rostrolateral PFC).16,18 Many of these regions 
have also been implicated in studies of political neurosci-
ence (see Figure 1 for a visual representation).19 These re-
gions allow for the integration of sensory information with 
affective knowledge and are thought to combine to produce 
an evaluation in any given situation.16,18 Importantly, the IR 
Model can explain potential differences in implicit versus 
explicit measurement of attitudes by inserting the concept 
of time. Initial responses are likely to be somewhat rapid 
and automatic (amygdala, insula), while later responses al-
low time for regions involved in more reflective processing 
to become involved (anterior cingulate cortex, dorsolateral 
PFC, rostrolateral PFC, and ventrolateral PFC). 
Figure 1. Brain regions and structures that are most commonly 
observed in studies of political neuroscience: views of (A) coro-
nal, (B) sagittal, and (C) midsagittal planes. Reprinted with per-
mission from Jost et al. 2014 (Ref. 19).   
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Importantly, recent work in social neuroscience has sug-
gested that we may need to further reevaluate how we 
think about attitudes. While the distinction between auto-
matic versus controlled processes has been generative for 
research, it may not be reflective of how the brain actually 
works. While some processes do happen more rapidly than 
others, even rapid evaluative processes (e.g., amygdala) are 
subject to guidance and input from what we would typi-
cally think about as more “controlled” systems. Consistent 
with this view, we have shown that amygdala activation is 
sensitive to evaluative goals.20 Given that people are con-
stantly monitoring the environment for stimuli and events 
that are goal congruent or incongruent, it makes sense that 
even early Signals in the brain are sensitive to this informa-
tion as well. 
4.1 The Psychology of Political Attitudes 
Political psychology research on political attitudes and eval-
uation has focused on similar issues in the context of poli-
tics. Many of these debates in political psychology have mir-
rored debates in social psychology—examining the role of 
online versus memory-based evaluation, automatic versus 
controlled processing, and the automaticity of affect. A num-
ber of papers, for example, have shown support for the “Hot 
Cognition Hypothesis,” or the idea that political attitudes are 
affectively charged and that this affective response is auto-
matically activated upon encountering a stimulus.21-23 This 
theory is somewhat reminiscent of the now infamous debate 
between Zajonc and Lazarus about the primacy of affect,24,25 
with Lodge and colleagues coming down on the side of Za-
jonc, arguing for the primacy of affect. Most of the neuroim-
aging work in political neuroscience related to attitudes and 
evaluation has focused on the evaluation of political policies 
or candidates, both in terms of rapid, automatic processes 
and slower, more controlled processes. 
4.2 Political Evaluation 
The amygdala has been implicated in multiple aspects of 
evaluative processing, including attitudes toward polit-
ical candidates. One early study in political neuroscience 
scanned participants while they completed an Implicit As-
sociation Test (IAT) using names and faces of well-known 
Democratic (e.g., Hillary Clinton, Al Gore) and Republican 
politicians (e.g., Condoleezza Rice, Ronald Reagan).26 Re-
sults showed that the amygdala responded to familiar faces, 
and the strength of the amygdala response was related to 
the strength of the affective response (positive or negative) 
toward both parties and candidates. This study also found 
fusiform gyrus activation for familiar faces and prefrontal 
cortex activation for various aspects of the task. While the 
authors conclude that these results are consistent with a 
dual processing view of attitudes, I think that is somewhat 
difficult to discern based on the results of this one study. 
The prefrontal cortex activation, for example, could have 
been related to activation of stereotypic knowledge, as they 
suggest, or more generally related to the cognitive demands 
of completing a task like the lAT. 
More recently, researchers have examined the amygdala 
response to political candidates across cultures, showing 
that the amygdala responded more strongly to faces of 
candidates that participants chose to vote for in samples 
from both the United States and Japan. However, the results 
from this study also showed that overall, the amygdala re-
sponded more strongly to cultural outgroup members than 
ingroup members. As with the previous study, the interpre-
tation of these results is somewhat dependent on current 
theories of the amygdala’s role in evaluative processing. 
Historically, the amygdala was thought to respond pri-
marily to negative or fear-inducing stimuli,28-30 but more re-
cent work has shown that the amygdala also responds to 
positive,31-33 arousing,34 uncertain,35 or motivationally rel-
evant20,36,37 stimuli. Given this ambiguity in terms of amyg-
dala function, the only thing we can really conclude here is 
that participants probably viewed these candidates as rele-
vant in some way and, given that participants chose to vote 
for them, we might assume that the amygdala response is 
related to positive evaluations. However, future work might 
be able to examine situations where this does or does not 
hold. From a political science perspective, we know that 
people sometimes vote because they are excited about their 
preferred candidate. However, it is also possible that peo-
ple vote because they are opposed to the candidate from 
the other party. Given that the amygdala responds to emo-
tional intensity or relevance, it could be the case that this 
pattern of responding would differ depending on some of 
these contextual or individual difference variables, but that 
is speculative at this point. 
Other researchers have focused on examining what hap-
pens when people view faces of candidates they dislike. For 
example, Kaplan and colleagues showed participants pic-
tures of the 2004 Presidential candidates’ faces (i.e., George 
W. Bush, John Kerry, Ralph Nader) during fMRI, demonstrat-
ing that when people were viewing opposition candidates, 
there was greater activation in dorsolateral PFC and ante-
rior cingulate.38 The authors suggest that this activation may 
be consistent with the idea that participants were engag-
ing cognitive control processes to regulate the negative re-
sponses, but because this was a passive viewing task, there 
is no direct evidence for this hypothesis. Future work could 
try to test this more directly.  
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More recent work has shown that this activation in insula 
and anterior cingulate to disliked candidates is also predic-
tive of election outcomes.39 Real-world candidates (selected 
from recent Congressional and Governor races) for whom 
participants showed greater activation in these areas were 
more likely to lose elections. Importantly, these research-
ers also showed that negative trait perceptions (i.e., threat) 
related to this activation were more predictive of election 
outcomes than positive trait perceptions, suggesting that 
there may be an overall negativity bias in candidate evalu-
ation. While this is consistent with a variety of work show-
ing evidence for a general negativity bias in evaluation,40,41 
it is worth noting that this study relied on rapid trait eval-
uations of candidates. Given more time, it is possible that 
positive information may have played a greater role in eval-
uation. In other words, it is possible that part of the reason 
for the negativity bias is that negative information has some 
degree of primacy in terms of temporal processing. Indeed, 
there do seem to be differences in terms of negative versus 
positive perceptions of ambiguous stimuli leading to activa-
tion in more ventral versus dorsal regions within the amyg-
dala.42 So, while it is possible that initial, negative percep-
tions may help drive perceptions of political candidates, it 
is worth considering the role of both ambivalence and time 
allowing for correction or modification of these early eval-
uative responses in future work. 
One remaining question here is whether there are dif-
ferences between active versus passive viewing of polit-
ical candidates, perhaps being representative of the dis-
tinction between automatic versus controlled processing 
or implicit versus explicit attitudes. Although, it is impor-
tant to remember that this distinction is likely an oversim-
plification of how the brain processes information.43 To ex-
amine the role of attention, participants in a recent study 
viewed pictures of German politicians during fMRI and ei-
ther attended to the pictures or viewed the pictures while 
completing a demanding visual fixation task.44 Politicians 
represented either the Christian Democratic Union Party 
or the Social Democratic Party. The researchers could then 
examine whether brain function differed during active ver-
sus passive viewing, and as a function of candidates’ party 
affiliation. When politicians were unattended, they found 
that regardless of party affiliation, preference for candi-
dates was related to activation in ventral striatum, a region 
often implicated in reward processing. Preferences for can-
didates of one’s preferred party was related to processing 
in additional regions, including. insula and cingulate cortex 
(both anterior and posterior regions). This work is consis-
tent with theories in political psychology such as the “Hot 
Cognition Hypothesis,” suggesting that people have a ten-
dency to automatically process political information (i.e., 
faces of political candidates). 
4.3 Motivated Reasoning 
Another important question in political psychology has 
been to examine the role of motivated reasoning. Classic 
research on attitudes in social psychology, for example, 
showed that people were able to distort incoming infor-
mation to be consistent with their prior beliefs, whether they 
were in favor of or opposed to the death penalty.45 Kunda 
offered a theoretical overview of motivated reasoning, sug-
gesting that people experience conflict between the moti-
vation for accuracy versus the motivation to reach desired 
conclusions.46 More recently, researchers have begun to ex-
amine the neural underpinnings of these effects. 
In another early study in political neuroscience, Westen 
and colleagues examined motivated reasoning by asking 
participants to make judgments during fMRI about infor-
mation that was threatening to either their own candidate, 
an opposing candidate, or a neutral control target.47 Data 
was collected from “committed partisans” during the 2004 
U.S. Presidential election. The study found behavioral ev-
idence for motivated reasoning, showing that Democrats 
were more likely to perceive contradictions from George 
W. Bush and vice versa, Republicans were more likely to 
perceive contradictions from John Kerry. When participants 
were engaged in motivated reasoning, a network of regions 
was involved including ventromedial PFC, anterior and pos-
terior cingulate cortex, insula, and lateral orbitofrontal cor-
tex. Given that many of these regions (e.g., insula, ACC, lat-
eral OFC) are involved in processing negative information, 
detecting conflict, and integrating cognitive, and affective 
responses,48-51 this overall pattern of results, seems consis-
tent with what we would expect when people are engaged 
in motivated reasoning. Interestingly, the study also found 
that when participants were given the opportunity to re-
solve this inconsistency, activation in ventral striatum was 
observed. Given that the ventral striatum has often been 
implicated in reward processing,52,53 this is consistent with 
the view that resolving inconsistency may be experienced 
as rewarding.  
4.4 Attitude Change 
While research on motivated reasoning has shown that peo-
ple often maintain preexisting attitudes through biased rea-
soning processes, it is important to note that attitudes can 
and do change in response to new information. Indeed, this 
was an important part of Kunda’s theory—people are also 
motivated by a desire for accuracy and may abandon de-
sired conclusions if the counter-attitudinal evidence is over-
whelming.46 Attitude change is more likely to occur when 
people do not hold strong preferences to begin with, or 
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when attitudes are weaker or less certain.54 Attitudes can 
become stronger—a positive attitude might become even 
more positive, or they can change valence—a positive at-
titude might become a negative attitude, for example. Im-
portantly, given our understanding of attitudes, these pos-
itive and negative processes appear to be independent of 
one another.55 So, thinking of an attitude purely as positive 
versus negative is likely an oversimplification. Attitudes can 
contain some degree of positive information, negative in-
formation, both (ambivalence), or neither (apathy). 
Researchers have begun to examine what leads to both 
positive and negative political attitude change using fMRI. It 
appears that different regions of the prefrontal cortex may 
be implicated in positive versus negative change. One study 
showed that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex response to 
negative campaign videos predicted attitude change in a 
negative direction—lower ratings of a political candidate.56 
It has been suggested that dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is 
involved in cognitive control and reprocessing of evaluative 
information,16,18,57 consistent with the idea that it may be 
involved in attitude change, especially for more abstracted 
information. The Kato study also showed a relationship be-
tween medial prefrontal cortex and increased ratings of can-
didates.56 This may be consistent with a larger body of work, 
suggesting that medial prefrontal cortex is implicated in 
Theory of Mind58—imagining the mental states of others—
and is more likely to occur when thinking about people we 
like (as opposed to those we dislike).59 That work will be de-
scribed in more detail below. 
5. Social Cognition and Politics 
The, term social cognition means different things to differ-
ent people, but for the purposes of this chapter I will focus 
primarily on discussing issues related to Theory of Mind or 
mentalizing. The overarching question guiding research in 
this area has been to determine how people think about 
and make decisions about the behavior of other people. 
Research on Theory of Mind has focused on under-
standing how people think about or “mentalize” about the 
minds of others. Engaging in this process allows individu-
als to think about the causes of others’ behavior and an-
ticipate how others will respond to them. At this point, the 
neural underpinnings of Theory of Mind are fairly well es-
tablished. Neuroimaging work has primarily focused on the 
role of the medial prefrontal cortex and temporoparietal 
junction.58,60 Interestingly, recent work has shown that peo-
ple may deploy this resource somewhat strategically. Kozak 
and colleagues showed, for example, that people were more 
likely to engage in Theory of Mind processing for liked ver-
sus disliked others.59 
In the political context, social cognition research has 
been applied primarily to understanding how people think 
about political candidates or politicians, although there are 
also examples of work examining how people think about 
politically similar or dissimilar others. This work has primarily 
focused on the role of the medial prefrontal cortex. Mitch-
ell and colleagues hypothesized that people would be more 
likely to mentalize about politically similar versus dissimi-
lar others.61 During fMRI, participants were presented with 
other people who either held similar or dissimilar political 
views. They found that ventromedial prefrontal cortex ac-
tivation was greater for similar others, whereas dorsal me-
dial prefrontal cortex activation was greater for dissimilar 
others. This is consistent with the behavioral work showing 
that people engage in mentalizing somewhat selectively.59 
Additional brain regions have been implicated in per-
spective taking, aside from the medial prefrontal cortex. In 
an fMRI study conducted immediately prior to the 2008 
election, Falk and colleagues showed that taking the per-
spective of a same party candidate resulted in greater 
poster cingulate cortex activation, whereas taking the per-
spective of an opposing candidate led to activation in bi-
lateral temporoparietal junction and insula.62 While many 
of these regions have been implicated in social cognition 
processes, it is still somewhat unclear why different regions 
within this network would respond differentially to ingroup 
versus outgroup targets. Given that there have only been 
two studies (to my knowledge) on the political neuroscience 
of perspective taking and Theory of Mind, this area is ripe 
for future investigation. 
6. Emotion and Politics 
Political science has had a long relationship with fields like 
economics that focus more on rational choice models of 
decision-making. But with increasing interest in psychol-
ogy and neuroscience, some political scientists have ex-
pressed a growing interest in understanding both biases in 
human information processing and the role of emotion. It 
is worth noting that it is not necessarily the case that emo-
tion leads to biased reasoning. It certainly can, but it is im-
portant to realize that emotion probably exists because it 
was adaptive. The amygdala’s role in fear detection, for ex-
ample, likely evolved because it was adaptive for both hu-
man and nonhuman animals to prioritize their response to 
threatening stimuli.37 Disgust is another emotion that is of-
ten described in terms of its evolutionary origins.63 Most of 
the recent work on emotion in social psychology and cog-
nitive neuroscience has focused on trying to understand the 
structure and function of emotion. Political scientists are in-
terested in emotion insofar as it helps to explain political 
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behavior. So, the focus for political scientists is more on how 
emotion influences political evaluation and decision making. 
6.1 Social Psychological Models of Emotion 
Social psychologists have offered many different theo-
ries of emotion over the years, with one potential starting 
point being the basic emotion models. These models at-
tempted to specify a set of emotions that were both ba-
sic and universal—the list typically included the basic six: 
happiness, sadness, fear, anger, disgust, and surprise.64,65 
While there is some evidence that the basic emotions map 
on to facial expressions, the evidence for unique neural 
substrates for each of these emotions is rather limited, 
perhaps even nonexistent.66,67 A more recent approach to 
emotion informed by work in affective neuroscience sug-
gests that psychological constructivism is likely the more 
appropriate approach.66 From this perspective, there is a 
network of brain regions involved in social and affective 
processes across emotion categories. Given that the ba-
sic emotion models may have limited explanatory power, 
social psychologists have proposed other models of emo-
tion over the years—most can be considered either dimen-
sional or appraisal models of emotion. 
Both dimensional and appraisal models have evolved 
and have become more complicated over time, especially 
given recent work in affective neuroscience, but I will sum-
marize the basic arguments here. The dimensional models 
of emotion typically attempt to simplify emotions into two 
or more dimensions. The most popular version being Rus-
sell’s Circumplex Model, which includes both valence (rang-
ing from positive to negative) and arousal (ranging from low 
to high).68 These dimensions are orthogonal, so emotions 
can be positive or negative and high in arousal (e.g., fear, 
excitement) or low in arousal (e.g., contentment, sadness). 
From this perspective, it is important to consider both va-
lence and arousal when examining the role of emotions—
to see if the impact of a given emotion is; due to its valence, 
arousal, or some interaction of the two. 
Appraisal models of emotion have focused more directly 
on the cognitive processes that give rise to the experience. 
of emotions—suggesting that emotions are constructed to 
help people deal with specific types of situations and re-
spond appropriately. Appraisal models have taken differ-
ent forms over the years, but typically suggest that peo-
ple have some sort of physiological or affective response, 
which then gets interpreted in light of the current situation 
or context and then gets labeled as a specific emotion.25 
This view is probably most consistent with the psychologi-
cal constructivism approach advanced by scholars like Lisa 
Feldman Barrett.66,67 Indeed, some of the newer appraisal 
models are directly informed by research on affective and 
computational neuroscience.69 
Importantly, the appraisal models have helped to elu-
cidate the idea that emotions, which may look similar in 
dimensional models, may actually have distinct behav-
ioral outcomes. For example, fear and anger are both high-
arousal negative emotions but have been shown to lead to 
different outcomes in relation to risky behavior.70 In general, 
fear is more likely to lead to avoidance behavior, whereas 
anger is more likely to lead to approach behavior.71 Re-
search on emotion and politics has only just begun to in-
corporate and adapt these models of emotion to increase 
our understanding of political behavior. 
6.2 Models of Emotion and Politics 
Political scientists have begun to incorporate models of 
emotion into their research, but I think it is fair to say that 
there is still much work to be done in this area. Early work 
in the area of emotion and politics focused on positive ver-
sus negative emotions, largely assuming that all negative 
emotions should lead to similar outcomes. However, con-
sistent with dimensional or appraisal models of emotion 
discussed above, the work in political psychology has in-
creasingly shown that emotions cannot  be collapsed into a 
simple valence dimension, and even emotions that look simi-
lar in terms of a dimensional analysis—fear and anger, for ex-
ample—lead to different outcomes in political behavior.72,73 
There have been some attempts to synthesize the current 
state of research on emotion and politics, and interested 
readers may want to review edited volumes such as The Af-
fect Effect for more background.74 I will give a brief overview 
of some of the recent work in political science below. 
Research on emotion and politics has shown that positive 
and negative emotions have differential impact on politics, 
but also that different negative emotions may have differ-
ent outcomes. For example, building on appraisal models of 
emotion, Huddy and colleagues have, attempted to distin-
guish among anxiety, anger, and threat, showing that each 
of these emotions has distinct connections to foreign pol-
icy preferences.75,76 Other work has examined how these 
emotions are connected to candidate appraisals and vot-
ing behavior, showing that emotions like hope and anger 
may be most likely to lead to voter mobilization.77 In con-
trast, emotions like anxiety may be more likely to lead peo-
ple to abstain from voting or reconsider their options and 
switch sides.78 At this point, there is only one major theory 
of emotion and politics that has been put forth, and I will 
outline that theory below. 
One of the primary theories in political science of how 
emotion influences politics is the Affective Intelligence The-
ory (AIT).78,79 Marcus and colleagues have argued for this 
theory on the basis of neurobiological models of affect, sug-
gesting that there is an important distinction to be made 
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between behavior in familiar versus unfamiliar contexts. 
When objects or situations are familiar, people can rely on 
preexisting attitudes and beliefs to guide behavior either 
toward (for appetitive stimuli) or away (for aversive stim-
uli) from that stimulus. When situations are unfamiliar, AIT 
argues that people will experience greater anxiety and en-
gage in additional information search in order to gain the 
information necessary to direct behavior in that situation. 
From this perspective, political scientists have shown sup-
port for the idea that anxiety leads to increased attention 
and political learning,80 consideration of opposing view-
points, and willingness to compromise.81 While this may be 
consistent with some of the research on uncertainty in social 
psychology and cognitive neuroscience, it is largely incon-
sistent with the large body of work linking uncertainty (and 
anxiety) to threat, suggesting the interplay of these affec-
tive states may be more complicated than initially assumed. 
From a motivational perspective, uncertainty can serve 
as a signal that we are lacking enough information to deal 
with situational challenges appropriately.82 While informa-
tional uncertainty may sometimes lead to an increase in 
epistemic motives, other types of uncertainty (e.g., personal 
uncertainty) may be inherently more threatening and lead 
to the opposite response—increased closed-mindedness.83 
One way to examine this question is to treat uncertainty and 
threat as distinct conceptual variables (see Figure 2). Threat 
can be understood as the potential for harm, whereas un-
certainty is often more ambiguous and context-depen-
dent, signaling any lack of information or clarity on some 
issue.84,85 From this perspective, uncertainty and threat in-
teract to produce distinct affective states that may then lead 
to distinct behavioral outcomes. 
In some of our work, we hypothesized that the effects of 
uncertainty on political tolerance would differ as a function 
of context—namely, whether the uncertainty was associated 
with threat or not (see Figure 3).84 In an experimental con-
text, we found that threat moderated the impact of uncer-
tainty on political tolerance. Uncertainty increased tolerance 
in a neutral or positive context, but decreased tolerance in 
a threatening context. In a more recent study, I found sup-
port for a similar pattern of results with respect to support 
for compromise—uncertainty increased support for com-
promise in a relatively neutral or positive context, but had 
no effect on support for compromise in a more threatening 
context.86 We are currently investigating the neural under-
pinnings of this interaction, both in terms of basic affective 
processes and political information processing. Preliminary 
analyses have shown that the amygdala, for example, re-
sponds differentially to uncertainty associated with nega-
tive versus positive affective information.85 
I have included a section about emotion and politics here 
not because there is a wealth of neuroimaging research on 
the topic, but because I think there should be. This is an 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
area of research where neuroimaging methods may be use-
ful, and there is plenty of opportunity in terms of available 
research questions. It is important to realize that the future 
goals of this research are unlikely to be quite so simple as 
mapping the neural pathways that differentiate basic emo-
tional responses. I think a more useful approach, at least in 
terms of the implications for politics, will be to focus on ex-
amining how different emotional experiences change polit-
ical information processing. While existing research in this 
area is limited, there has been a fair amount of work exam-
ining individual differences in response to affective stimuli, 
primarily between political liberals versus conservatives. In 
the following section, I will provide an overview of political 
neuroscience research on individual differences. 
7. Individual Differences in Political 
Behavior 
One of the questions that fMRI is well-suited for is asking 
whether brain function differs across different types of peo-
ple. Work in political neuroscience has taken advantage of 
this to examine differences in social and affective process-
Figure 2. Conceptual relationship between uncertainty and 
threat. Reprinted with permission from Haas et al. 2014 (Ref 84). 
Figure 3. Hypothesized relationship between uncertainty and 
political tolerance as a function of threat. Reprinted with per-
mission from Haas et al. 2014 (Ref 84).   
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ing as a function of individual differences in political ideol-
ogy, values, and political interest and expertise. 
7.1 Ideological Differences 
Ideological differences has been one of the primary topics 
guiding neuroimaging work on politics. The growth of po-
litical neuroscience studies on this topic is likely related to 
increased interest in both psychological and biological dif-
ferences between liberals and conservatives. In 2003, Jost 
and colleagues published a meta-analysis arguing that con-
servatism has motivational underpinnings, primarily related 
to differential response to negative or threatening informa-
tion.87 Recent work in the area of biopolitics has largely cor-
roborated this idea, showing that conservatives and liberals 
differ in their physiological response to negatively valenced 
emotional stimuli.88-92 The relevant neuroimaging work has 
used both structural and functional neuroimaging to exam-
ine the neural underpinnings of these psychological and 
biological differences between liberals and conservatives. 
7.1.1 Brain Structure 
Given the growing evidence of a link between biology, 
genetics, and ideological differences, one possibility is that 
liberalism versus conservatism is related to differences in 
brain structure. Consistent with this idea, one study has 
shown structural brain differences between liberals and 
conservatives. Kanai and colleagues used structural MRI to 
examine gray matter volume, finding that liberals had in-
creased volume in the anterior cingulate cortex, whereas 
conservatives had increased volume in the right amygdala, 
left insula, and right entorhinal cortex (see Figure 4).93 While 
this work supports the hypothesis that liberals and con-
servatives have different brain structure, there are multiple 
ways to interpret this data and I think some caution is war-
ranted, given that this is just one study. 
First, it is probably necessary to consider whether or not 
these structural differences are indicative of functional brain 
differences. It is not necessarily the case that having more 
gray matter in a region means you will find significant dif-
ferences in function, but it does mean that these brain re-
gions are probably worth examining in subsequent stud-
ies of brain function. While this is purely speculative at this 
point, the amygdala finding from the Kanai study could be 
consistent with behavioral work suggesting that conserva-
tives are more sensitive to threat or negativity than liber-
als.87,89,94 However, it is important to note that the relation-
ship between amygdala activation and fear or negativity is 
not a one-to-one mapping. While the amygdala has been 
implicated in fear, it has also been implicated in responses 
to positive or arousing information, as discussed earlier in 
this chapter.31-33 More recent theorizing about amygdala 
function has suggested that the amygdala response is not 
specific to positive or negative information per se, but that 
the amygdala may respond to any information that is mo-
tivationally relevant for the individual.95 
Second, structural differences are also difficult to inter-
pret because there is sometimes an assumption that they 
are an indicator of biological or genetic differences in brain 
growth or development (suggesting the influence of nature 
over nurture). An alternative, or perhaps complementary, 
viewpoint is that brain structure is influenced not just by 
biology and genetics, but also. by psychology and behav-
ior. For example, some recent longitudinal work has shown 
that a stress-reduction intervention actually reduced both 
reported stress level and gray matter volume in the right 
basolateral amygdala.96 So, having a larger amygdala might 
increase  sensitivity to stress, but a decrease in stress may 
also decrease the size of the amygdala. Jost and colleagues 
have labeled this the “chicken-and-egg” problem in  politi-
cal neuroscience.19,89 It could be the case that genetic  dif-
ferences shape brain structure in a way that gives rise to 
ideological differences, or it could be the case that people 
adopt certain patterns of behavior and that behavior then 
shapes brain structure. In reality, brain structure is probably 
determined by some combination of these two perspectives. 
The take-home point is that we need to be careful about as-
suming causal relationships from studies of brain structure. 
Regardless of the causal pathways, the Kanai study93 sug-
gested to researchers that these regions (e.g., the amygdala 
and anterior cingulate) are worth examining in future stud-
ies of ideology, brain structure, and brain function. 
Figure 4. Individual differences in political attitudes and brain struc-
ture. Reprinted with permission from Kanai et al. 2011 (Ref 93).   
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7.1.2 Brain Function 
Research on whether or not brain function differs be-
tween liberals and conservatives is still relatively limited, but 
the existing research is consistent with the idea that there 
may be processing differences in regions implicated in so-
cial and affective processing—such as the amygdala, insula, 
and anterior cingulate. One recent study showed that dur-
ing a decision-making task, Democrats showed greater ac-
tivation in the left insula and Republicans showed greater 
activation in the right amygdala.97 Interestingly, while brain 
function appeared to differ, the decisions participants made 
in this study did not. In other words, it could be the case 
that these differences are due, at least in part, to differences 
in the decision-making process as opposed to the outcomes. 
This conclusion should be treated as tentative at this point, 
given that this is just one study and other research has 
shown that there may be differences in both process and 
outcomes. Using EEG, Amodio and colleagues found that 
liberals demonstrated greater conflict-related activity and 
were more accurate on a go/no-go task.98 The conflict-re-
lated activity on no-go trials was localized to the dorsal an-
terior cingulate cortex, which is one of the regions where 
structural differences between liberals and conservatives 
have been found.93 Taken together, these studies suggest 
that there may be functional differences between liberals 
and conservatives in some of the regions where structural 
differences were previously found—the amygdala, insula, 
and anterior cingulate. 
A lot of the recent behavioral work or work in biopoli-
tics has focused on ideological differences in emotional re-
sponding, suggesting that liberals and conservatives may 
differ in their response to negatively-valenced emotional 
stimuli.88,89 Only one study (that I am aware of) has exam-
ined this question using neuroimaging. Ahn and colleagues 
had participants engage in a passive viewing task during 
fMRI using stimuli (emotional images) from the Interna-
tional Affective Picture System (IAPS).99 Consistent with be-
havioral work showing that conservatives are more respon-
sive to disgust,91,100 conservatives in this study appeared to 
be more sensitive to disgusting images (especially those im-
ages related to animal mutilation). Liberals showed· greater 
activation than conservatives to disgusting stimuli mainly 
in the insula, whereas for conservatives, there was greater 
activation for this contrast (disgust > neutral) in a whole 
network of regions, including the amygdala, hippocampus, 
basal ganglia, thalamus, anterior cingulate, dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex, and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. While 
this is consistent with the view that conservatives may be 
more sensitive to disgusting stimuli than liberals, it is diffi-
cult to conclude what processes each of these regions may 
have been engaged in, given that this was a passive view-
ing task. Future work may want to examine differences be-
tween liberals and conservatives using different tasks that 
require additional processing demands (e.g., emotion reg-
ulation). It could be the case that liberals and conservatives 
respond differently to disgusting images, or they might dif-
ferentially engage emotion regulation strategies to cope 
with the disgust response. 
While a growing body of work has suggested that con-
servatives may be more sensitive to negative information 
than liberals,87,99 one alternative perspective is that con-
servatives are more sensitive to arousal (and not negativity, 
per se).89,101 From the perspective of dimensional models 
of emotion (see earlier section on Emotion and Politics), it 
is important to consider both the valence of emotions and 
their level of arousal. If researchers are comparing high-
arousal negative emotions to low-arousal positive emotions, 
any observed differences could be due either to valence 
(negative-positive) or arousal (low-high). It is important to 
note that the Ahn study did not examine differences be-
tween negative versus positive emotions directly, and the 
positive images used in the study appear to be lower in 
arousal (e.g., animals, babies) than the negative images used 
(e.g., snakes, violence, mutilation).99 So, the question about 
whether conservatives are more responsive to negative or 
highly arousing stimuli, even when positively valenced, re-
mains.101 To examine this question directly, researchers will 
need to compare emotional responses to positive and neg-
ative stimuli while controlling for, equating, or manipulat-
ing arousal. 
7.2 Values 
An alternative approach to understanding ideological dif-
ferences in brain function has been to examine differences 
in neural processing related to specific values that might 
underlie ideological differences. This research builds on a 
long tradition in psychology and political science of study-
ing values as a way to understand political attitudes.102 Po-
litical ideology has been most closely tied to values related 
to preference for tradition versus change and views about 
equality.103 Neuroimaging work has attempted to exam-
ine the brain activity that might underlie political decision-
making related to these values, although this work has been 
largely exploratory. 
Zamboni and colleagues had participants evaluate polit-
ical beliefs during fMRI and examined the relationship be-
tween evaluative processing and values—individualism, con-
servatism, and radicalism.104 They found differentiation on 
the basis of these values: individualism was related to ac-
tivity in the ventromedial and dorsomedial prefrontal cor-
tex and temporoparietal junction, conservatism was related 
to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and radicalism was re-
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lated to the ventral striatum and posterior cingulate. While 
this research does suggest that values may be related to 
differential processing of political statements, it is still un-
clear why these differences are occurring or how they map 
on to differences in the process of decision-making. The au-
thors do speculate about what this activation might mean—
perhaps individualism-related prefrontal cortex activation 
signals self-referential processing, dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex activation might be related to additional evaluative 
processing for liberals versus conservatives, and radicalism 
might be related to greater emotional responses to these 
statements.104 It is important to note, however, that these 
assumptions are based on reverse inference and may or 
may not be corroborated by future work. Additional work 
will be needed to test these assumptions directly. 
A second study on this topic focused on the role of egal-
itarianism, showing that egalitarian preferences during a de-
cision-making task were related to activation in the insula 
and ventromedial PPC.105 The insula has been implicated in 
a number of studies related to emotion and empathy, or just 
more general integration of bodily states, so this connec-
tion between insula activity and egalitarianism seems plau-
sible. But again, more work will be needed to clearly exam-
ine the underlying mechanisms here. 
7.3 Political Interest and Expertise 
Another important individual difference that has often 
been discussed by political scientists is the distinction be-
tween political experts versus novices. The classic research 
in political science often discussed differences between the 
mass public versus political elites, often arguing that polit-
ical elites were really the only individuals with something 
that resembled a political ideology.106 This question has also 
been examined through the use of neuroimaging methods, 
looking primarily at differences between political experts 
versus novices or people who are highly interested in poli-
tics versus uninterested. 
Interestingly, while the impact of expertise on brain func-
tion has often been discussed in a cold, cognitive sense, 
purely in relation to knowledge, it may be the case that there 
is a motivational component as well. In other words, some 
people may actually be motivated to learn or read about pol-
itics and may experience that activity as rewarding. Consistent 
with this view, Gozzi and colleagues showed that individu-
als with a strong interest in politics experience greater acti-
vation in the amygdala and ventral striatum (putamen) when 
reading statements they agreed with.107 While we need to 
be careful about making reverse inferences here, this is con-
sistent with the idea that viewing these positive statements 
may be rewarding for individuals interested in politics. Inter-
estingly, this may help explain why some political junkies lit-
erally cannot stop reading about or watching the news. 
8. Directions For Future Research 
The field of political neuroscience is relatively young, and 
research in this area is fairly limited at this point. While this 
makes it difficult to generalize and draw broader conclu-
sions based on the work, I think we do have enough at this 
point to say that neuroimaging has the potential to inform 
research in political psychology and biopolitics. The chal-
lenge for researchers then becomes figuring out how we 
should move forward in this interdisciplinary area. Below, 
I offer some suggestions for researchers currently working 
in the field of political neuroscience, or those who are in-
terested in getting involved in this work. 
Most, if not all, of the political neuroscience studies 
described here have been exploratory in nature. There is 
nothing inherently wrong with this, given that exploratory 
research is often the first stage of a larger research pro-
gram—gathering initial data on important questions can 
help clarify theory and generate hypotheses for subse-
quent research. However, I do think we are getting closer 
to the point where we can move out of the initial explor-
atory phase and into the hypothesis-testing phase. 
The main problem with exploratory fMRI studies is that 
they are difficult to interpret, for a number of reasons. As 
discussed at the outset of this chapter, fMRI data is cor-
relational. It is difficult (if not impossible) to demonstrate 
causal relationships using fMRI data. The bigger issue with 
these exploratory studies is that interpretation has largely 
relied on reverse inference and assumptions about the pro-
cesses that participants were engaged in during the task. 
Now that some of this initial work has been conducted, we 
can start to develop more nuanced hypotheses about how 
people are processing political information and why we are 
observing brain activation in specific regions or networks. 
Given that we have specific hypotheses about brain mech-
anisms, we can carefully design experimental tasks to test 
these mechanisms by directly manipulating or measuring 
variables of interest. Only through careful experimentation 
can we determine, for example, why the amygdala is re-
sponding to political candidates, how the amygdala is in-
volved in political evaluation, how this differs across indi-
viduals, and what the boundary conditions are that limit or 
constrain these effects. 
It would be impossible to overemphasize the importance 
of careful research design in the fMRI environment. In an 
ideal world, any political neuroscience study using fMRI 
would include the following: theoretical background, spe-
cific hypotheses about brain function, behavioral pilot data, 
careful experimental design with multiple conditions, task 
data during scanning (as well as relevant postscan ratings), 
measurement of relevant individual differences, and great 
care taken when drawing conclusions not to overgeneral-
ize or rely on unwarranted reverse inferences about brain 
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function. Other scholars have offered similar suggestions 
for those working in the field of political neuroscience,7 as 
well as those working in social and affective neuroscience 
more generally.108 
It is worth noting here that there is a relatively steep 
learning curve when it comes to learning neuroimaging 
methods such as fMRI, so collaboration among interdisci-
plinary teams should be encouraged. Political scientists in-
terested in working in the area of political neuroscience will 
likely benefit from working with social and cognitive psy-
chologists, who have expertise in experimental design, as 
well as social and cognitive neuroscientists, who have ex-
pertise in conducting research within the MRI context and 
dealing with unique considerations for both experimental 
design and data analysis. Psychologists and neuroscientists 
interested in politics can benefit from working with politi-
cal scientists, who have expertise in the role of context and 
are more well-versed in issues related to external validity. 
Many fMRI studies, especially early studies using this meth-
odology, have relied on very small sample sizes, typically 
with convenience samples. I think future studies in political 
neuroscience will probably want to move toward collecting 
data from larger, more diverse samples and attempt to use 
that data to predict real-world outcomes, in addition to per-
formance on experimental tasks. These are ambitious goals 
and might be difficult for any lone scientist to master but 
will likely be easier to tackle in larger, interdisciplinary teams. 
There is one very good reason why fMRI studies have 
typically relied on small sample sizes—cost. Given the ex-
pense attached to doing research using fMRI (as of this 
writing, an hour of scan time typically costs around $500 or 
$600 at universities in the US), the challenge for research-
ers becomes trying to figure out if and when fMRI will be a 
valuable method to add to their toolbox. Many questions 
in political science may not require the use of methods like 
fMRI, and researchers should not feel obligated to use these 
methods if they are not directly relevant to the questions 
they are interested in. fMRI is most likely to be a useful tool 
when researchers have ideas about processes or mecha-
nisms that give rise to observable political behavior and 
are interested in testing whether or not those mechanisms 
are tenable given neurobiological structure and function. 
9. Conclusion 
Neuroimaging cannot replace traditional methods and mea-
surement techniques in political science, but it can serve 
as a useful technique for examining whether or not theo-
ries about political behavior are biologically plausible. Social 
psychology has demonstrated over the years that people 
have many assumptions about human behavior that are not 
always supported at the behavioral level, and the same is 
likely true for what neuroimaging can show us at the neural 
level. For example, neuroscience work has already led many 
scientists to question some of the traditional assumptions 
that have guided research on social behavior in recent de-
cades—that emotion and cognition are distinct processes, 
or that implicit versus explicit attitudes are categorically dis-
tinct and stored separately in memory—and it will likely lead 
us to question many other assumptions about human be-
havior. We have really only just begun trying to use neuro-
imaging methods to understand how people make social 
and political decisions at the neural level, and it will likely 
be the case that, in the years to come, we will continue to 
learn that our current theories of human social and politi-
cal behavior are incomplete. 
In sum, while research in political neuroscience has in-
creased rapidly in recent years, we still have a long way to 
go before we have a clear picture of the neural mecha-
nisms that underlie political evaluation, cognition, and de-
cision-making. While this means there are still a number of 
challenges for researchers working in this area in terms of 
methods, design, and interpretation, it also means it is an 
exciting time for anyone interested in the subfield of politi-
cal neuroscience, either as a participant or an observer. It is 
an area of research where there is still much left to explore. 
References 
1. McDennott R. The case for increasing dialogue between 
political science and neuroscience. Political Res Q. 2009; 
62(3):571-583. 
2. Lopez AC, McDennott R. Adaptation, heritability, and the 
emergence of evolutionary political science. Political Psy-
chol. 2012; 33(3):343-362. 
3. Friston KJ. Modalities, modes, and models in functional neu-
roimaging. Science. October 16, 2009; 326(5951):399-403. 
4. Cacioppo JT, Visser PS. Political psychology and social neuro-
science: Strange bedfellows or comrades in arms? Political 
Psychol. 2003; 24(4):647-656. 
5. Liebennan MD, Schreiber D, Ochsner KN. Is political cogni-
tion like riding a bicycle? How cognitive neuroscience can 
inform research on political thinking. Political Psychol, 2003; 
24:681-704. 
6. Raichle ME. Social neuroscience: A role for brain imaging. Po-
litical Psychol. 2003; 24:759-764. 
7. Theodoridis AG, Nelson AJ. Of BOLD claims and excessive 
fears: A call for caution and patience regarding political neu-
roscience. Political Psychol. 2012; 33(1):27-43. 
8. Logothetis N, Pauls J, Augath M, Trinath T, Oeltennann A. Neu-
rophysiological investigation of the basis of the fMRI signal. 
Nature. 2001; 412(6843):150-157. 
9. Logothetis NK, Wandell BA. Interpreting the BOLD signal. 
Annu Rev Physiol. 2004; 66:735-769. 
368 I .  Haas  in Neuroimaging Personal ity ,  Social  Cognit ion,  and Character  (2016) 
10. Greenwald AG, McGhee DE, Schwartz JLK. Measuring indi-
vidual differences in implicit cognition: The implicit associa-
tion test. J Pers Soc Psychol. 1998; 74:1464-1480. 
11. Payne BK, Cheng CM, Govorun O, Stewart BD. An inkblot for 
attitudes: Affect misattribution as implicit measurement. J 
Pers Soc Psychol. September 2005; 89(3):277-293. 
12. Murphy ST, Zajonc RB. Affect, cognition, and awareness: Af-
fective priming with optimal and suboptimal stimulus expo-
sures. J Pers Soc Psychol. 1993; 64(5):723-739. 
13. Gawronski B, Bodenhausen GV. Unraveling the processes un-
derlying evaluation: Attitudes from the perspective of the 
APE model. Soc Cogn. 2007; 25:687-717. 
14. DeCoster J, Banner MJ, Smith ER, Semin GR. On the inexpli-
cability of the implicit: Differences in the information pro-
vided by implicit and explicit tests. Soc Cogn. 2006; 24:5-21. 
15. Deutsch R, Strack F. Duality models in social psychology: 
From dual processes to interacting systems. Psychol Inquiry. 
2006; 17:166-172. 
16. Cunningham WA, Zelazo PD, Packer DJ, Van Bavel IT. The it-
erative reprocessing model: A multilevel framework for atti-
tudes and evaluation. Soc Cogn. 2007; 25:736-760. 
17. Fazio RH. Attitudes as object-evaluation associations of vary-
ing strength. Soc Cogn. 2007; 25:603-637. 
18. Cunningham WA, Zelazo PD. Attitudes and evaluations: A 
social cognitive neuroscience perspective. Trends Cogn Sci. 
2007;  11:97-104. 
19. Jost JT, Nam HH, Amodio DM, Van Bavel IT. Political neuro-
science: The beginning of a beautiful friendship. Adv Politi-
cal Psychol. 2014; 35:3-42. 
20. Cunningham WA, Van Bavel IT, Johnsen lR. Affective flexibil-
ity: Evaluative processing goals shape amygdala activity. Psy-
chol Sci. 2008; 19:152-160. 
21. Burdein I, Lodge M, Taber C. Experiments on the automatic-
ity of political beliefs and attitudes. Political Psychol. 2006; 
27(3): 359-371. 
22. Lodge M, Taber CS. The automaticity of affect for political 
leaders, groups, and issues: An experimental test of the hot 
cognition hypothesis. Political Psychol. 2005; 26:455-482. 
23. Morris JP, Squires NK, Taber CS, Lodge M. Activation of polit-
ical attitudes: A psychophysiological examination of the hot 
cognition hypothesis. Political Psychol. 2003; 24(4):727-745. 
24. Zajonc RB. On the primacy of affect. Am Psychol. 1984; 
39:117-123. 
25. Lazarus RS. Cognition and motivation in emotion. Am Psy-
chol. 1991; 46:352-367. 
26. Knutson KM, Wood IN, Spampinato MV, Grafman J. Poli-
tics on the brain: An fMRl investigation. Soc Neurosci. 2006; 
1:25-40. 
27. Rule NO, Freeman JB, Moran JM, Gabrieli JD, Adams Jr RB, 
Ambady N. Voting behavior is reflected in amygdala re-
sponse across cultures. Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci. June 2010; 
5(2-3): 349-355. 
28. LeDoux IE, Cicchetti P, Xagoraris A, Romanski LM. The lateral 
amygdaloid nucleus: Sensory interface of the amygdala in 
fear conditioning. J Neurosci. 1990; 10:1062-1069. 
29. Davis M. The role of the amygdala in fear and anxiety. Annu 
Rev Neurosci. 1992; 15:353-375. 
30. Adolphs R, Tranel D, Damasio H, Damasio AR. Fear and the 
human amygdala. J Neurosci. 1995; 15:5879-5891. 
31. Garavan H, Pendergrass JC, Ross TJ, Stein EA, Risinger RC. 
Amygdala response to both positive and negatively valenced 
stimuli. Neuroreport. 2001; 12:2779-2783. 
32. Hamann SB, Ely TO, Hoffman JM, Kilts CD. Ecstasy and ag-
ony: Activation of the human amygdala in positive and neg-
ative emotion. Psychol Sci. 2002; 13:135-141. 
33. Hamann SB, Mao H. Positive and negative emotional ver-
bal stimuli elicit activity in the left amygdala. Neuroreport. 
2002; 13:15-19. 
34. Adolphs R, Russell JA, Tranel D. A role for the human amyg-
dala in recognizing emotional arousal from unpleasant stim-
uli. Psychol Sci. 1999; 10:167-171. 
35. Whalen PJ. The uncertainty of it all. Trends Cogn Sci. Decem-
ber 2007; 11:499-500. 
36. Ousdal OT, Jensen J, Server A, Hariri AR, Nakstad PH, Andre-
assen OA. The human amygdala is involved in general be-
havioral relevance detection: Evidence from an event-related 
functional magnetic resonance imaging Go-NoGo task. Neu-
roscience. October 15, 2008; 156(3):450-455. 
37. Sander D, Grafman J, Zalla T. The human amygdala: An 
evolved system for relevance detection. Rev Neurosci. 2003; 
14:303-316. 
38. Kaplan JT, Freedman J, Iacoboni M. Us versus them: Politi-
cal attitudes and party affiliation influence neural responses 
to faces of presidential candidates. Neuropsychologia. 2007; 
45:55-64. 
39. Spezio ML, Rangel A, Alvarez RM, et al. A neural basis for the 
effect of candidate appearance on election outcomes. Soc 
Cogn Affect Neurosci. December 2008; 3(4):344-352. 
40. Ito TA, Larsen JT, Smith NK, Cacioppo JT. Negative infor-
mation weighs more heavily on the brain: The negativity 
bias in evaluative categorizations. J Pers Soc Psychol. 1998; 
75:887-900. 
41. Fazio RH, Eiser JR, Shook NJ. Attitude formation through ex-
ploration: Valence asymmetries. J Pers Soc Psychol. 2004; 
87:293-311. 
42. Neta M, Whalen PJ. The primacy of negative interpretations 
when resolving the valence of ambiguous facial expressions. 
Psychol Sci. July 2010; 21(7):901-907. 
43. Van Bavel IT, Xiao YJ, Cunningham W A. Evaluation is a dy-
namic process: moving beyond dual system models. Soc Pers 
Psychol Compass. 2012; 6:438-454. 
44. Tusche A, Kahnt T, Wisniewski D, Haynes JD. Automatic pro-
cessing of political preferences in the human brain. Neuro-
image. May 15,2013; 72:174-182. 
45. Lord CG, Ross L, Lepper MR. Biased assimilation and at-
titude polarization: The effects of prior theories on sub-
sequently considered evidence. J Pers Soc Psychol. 1979; 
37:2098-2109. 
Polit ical  Neuroscience   369
46. Kunda Z. The case for motivated reasoning. Psychol Bull. 
1990; 108:480-498. 
47. Westen D, Blagov PS, Harenski K, Kilts C, Hamann S. Neural 
bases of motivated reasoning: An fMRl study of emotional 
constraints on partisan political judgment in the 2004 U.S. 
presidential election. J Cogn Neurosci. 2006; 18:1947-1958. 
48. Botvinick MM, Braver TS, Barch DM, Carter CS, Cohen JD. 
Conflict monitoring and cognitive control. Psychol Rev. 2001; 
108(3):624-652 
49. Gu X, Liu X, Van Dam NT, Hof PR, Fan J. Cognition-emotion 
integration in the anterior insular cortex. Cereb Cortex. Jan-
uary 2013; 23(1):20-27. 
50. Cunningham WA, Johnsen IR, Waggoner AS. Orbitofron-
tal cortex provides cross-modal valuation of self-generated 
stimuli. Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci. 2011; 6:286-293. 
51. Kringelbach ML, Rolls ET. The functional neuroanatomy 
of the human orbitofrontal cortex: Evidence from neu-
roimaging and neuropsychology. Prog Neurobiol. 2004; 
72:341-372. 
52. Grahn JA, Parkinson JA, Owen AM. The cognitive functions 
of the caudate nucleus. Prog Neurobiol. November 2008; 
86(3):141-155. 
53. Kuhn S, Gallinat J. The neural correlates of subjective pleas-
antness. Neuroimage. May 15, 2012; 61(1):289-294. 
54. Petty RE, Krosnick JA, eds. Attitude Strength: Antecedents and 
Consequences. Mahwah: Erlbaum Associates;  1995. 
55. Cacioppo JT, Berntson GG. Relationship between attitudes 
and evaluative space: A critical review, with emphasis on the 
separability of positive and negative substrates. Psychol Bull. 
1994; 115:401-423. 
56. Kato J, Ide H, Kabashima I, Kadota H, Takano K, Kansaku K. 
Neural correlates of attitude change following positive and 
negative advertisements. Front Behav Neurosci. 2009; 3:1-13. 
57. O’Reilly RC, Noelle DC, Braver TS, Cohen JD. Prefrontal cor-
tex and dynamic categorization tasks: Representational orga-
nization and neuromodulatory control. Cereb Cortex. 2002; 
12:246-257. 
58. Frith U, Frith CD. Development and neurophysiology of men-
talizing. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. March 29, 2003; 
358(1431): 459-473. 
59. Kozak MN, Marsh AA, Wegner DM. What do I think you’re 
doing? Action identification and mind attribution. J Pers Soc 
Psychol. 2006; 90(4):543-555. 
60. Saxe R, Kanwisher N. People thinking about thinking peo-
ple: The role of the temporo-parietal junction in “theory of 
mind”. Neuroimage. 2003; 19:1835-1842. 
61. Mitchell JP, Macrae CN, Banaji MR. Dissociable medial pre-
frontal contributions to judgments of similar and dissimilar 
others. Neuron. 2006; 50:655-663. 
62. Falk EB, Spunt RP, Lieberman MD. Ascribing beliefs to ingroup 
and outgroup political candidates: Neural correlates of per-
spective-taking, issue importance and days until the election. 
Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 2012; 367(1589):731-743. 
63. Rozin P, Haidt J. The domains of disgust and their origins: 
Contrasting biological and cultural evolutionary accounts. 
Trends Cogn Sci. 2013; 17(8):367-368. 
64. Ekman P. Are there basic emotions? Psychol Rev. 1992; 
99:550-553. 
65. Ekman P. An argument for basic emotions. Cogn Emotion. 
1992;  6(3/4):169-200. 
66. Lindquist KA, Wager TD, Kober H, Bliss-Moreau E, Barrett LF. 
The brain basis of emotion: A meta-analytic review. Behav 
Brain Sci. June 2012; 35(3):121-143. 
67. Barrett LF. Are emotions natural kinds? Perspect Psychol Sci. 
2006; 1:25-58. 
68. Russell J. A circumplex model of affect. J Pers Soc Psychol. 
1980;  39:1161-1178. 
69. Scherer KR. Emotions are emergent processes: They require 
a dynamic computational architecture. Philos Trans R Soc 
Lond B Biol Sci. December 12, 2009; 364(1535):3459-3474. 
70. Lerner JS, Keltner D. Fear, anger, and risk. J Pers Soc Psychol. 
2001; 81(1):146-159. 
71. Harmon-Jones E. Clarifying the emotive functions of asym-
metrical frontal cortical activity. Psychophysiology. 2003; 
40:835-848. 
72. Lerner JS, Gonzalez RM, Small DA, Fischhoff B. Effects of fear 
and anger on perceived risks of terrorism: A national field ex-
periment. Psychol Sci. 2003; 14(2):144-150. 
73. Skitka LJ, Bauman CW, Aramovich NP, Morgan GS. Confron-
tational and preventative policy responses to terrorism: An-
ger wants a fight and fear wants “them” to go away. Basic 
Appl Soc Psychol. 2006; 28:375-384. 
74. Neuman WR, Marcus GE, Crigler A, MacKuen M, eds. The Af-
fect Effect:  Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Be-
havior. Chicago: University of Chicago Press;  2007. 
75. Huddy L, Feldman S, Cassese E. On the distinct political ef-
fects of anxiety and anger. In: Neuman WR, Marcus GE, Cri-
gler AN, MacKuen M, eds. The Affect Effect: Dynamics of 
Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior. Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press;  2007:202-230. 
76. Huddy L, Feldman S, Taber C. Threat, anxiety, and support of 
antiterrorism policies. Am J Political Sci. 2005; 49:593-608. 
77. Just MR, Crigler AN, Belt TL. Don’t give up hope: Emotions, 
candidate appraisals, and votes. In: Neuman WR, Marcus GE, 
Crigler AN, MacKuen M, eds. The Affect Effect: Dynamics of 
Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior. Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press;  2007. 
78. MacKuen M, Marcus GE, Neuman WR, Keele L. The third 
way: The theory of affective intelligence and American de-
mocracy. In: Neuman WR, Marcus GE, Crigler AN, MacKuen 
M, eds. The Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political 
Thinking and Behavior. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 
2007:124-151. 
79. Marcus GE, Neuman WR, MacKuen M. Affective Intelligence 
and Political Judgment. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 
2000. 
80. Marcus GE, MacKuen MB. Anxiety, enthusiasm, and the vote: 
The emotional underpinnings of learning and involvement 
370 I .  Haas  in Neuroimaging Personal ity ,  Social  Cognit ion,  and Character  (2016) 
during presidential campaigns. Am Political Sci Rev. 1993; 
87: 672-685. 
81. MacKuen M, Wolak J, Keele L, Marcus GE. Civic engagements: 
Resolute partisanship or reflective deliberation. Am J Politi-
cal Sci. 2010; 54:440-458. 
82. Hirsh JB, Mar RA, Peterson JB. Psychological entropy: A 
framework for understanding uncertainty-related anxiety. 
Psychol Rev. January 16, 2012; 119(2):304. 
83. McGregor I, Nash K, Mann N, Phills CEo Anxious uncertainty 
and reactive approach motivation (RAM). J Pers Soc Psychol. 
2010; 99:133-147. 
84. Haas IJ, Cunningham WA. The uncertainty paradox: Perceived 
threat moderates the effect of uncertainty on political toler-
ance. Political Psychol. 2014; 35(2):291-302. 
85. Haas IJ. The Context-Dependent Nature of Uncertainty: Re-
sponses to Uncertainty are Moderated by the Presence or 
Absence of Threat [Dissertation]. Columbus: Department of 
Psychology, The Ohio State University;  2012. 
86. Haas IJ. Uncertainty, Threat, and Support for Political Com-
promise during the 2013 U.S. Government Shutdown;  Man-
uscript submitted for publication. 2015. 
87. Jost JT, Glaser J, Kruglanski AW, Sulloway FJ. Political con-
servatism as motivated social cognition. Psychol Bull. 2003; 
129:339-375. 
88. Hibbing JR, Smith KB, Peterson JC, Feher B. The deeper 
sources of political conflict: Evidence from the psycholog-
ical, cognitive, and neuro-sciences. Trends Cogn Sci. March 
2014; 18(3):111-113. 
89. Hibbing JR, Smith KB, Alford JR. Differences in negativity bias 
underlie variations in political ideology. Behav Brain Sci. June 
2014; 37(3):297-307. 
90. Oxley DR, Smith KB, Alford JR, et al. Political attitudes vary 
with physiological traits. Science. 2008; 321:1667-1670. 
91. Smith KB, Oxley D, Hibbing MY, Alford JR, Hibbing JR. Dis-
gust sensitivity and the neurophisiology of left-right politi-
cal orientations. PLoS One. 2011; 6(10):e25552. 
92. Dodd MD, Balzer A, Jacobs CM, Gruszczynski MW, Smith KB, 
Hibbing JR. The political left rolls with the good and the po-
litical right confronts the bad: Connecting physiology and 
cognition to preferences. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 
March 5, 2012; 367(1589):640--649. 
93. Kanai R, Feilden T, Firth C, Rees G. Political orientations are 
correlated with brain structure in young adults. Curr Biol. 
2011; 21(8):677--680. 
94. Shook NJ, Fazio RH. Political ideology, exploration of novel 
stimuli, and attitude formation. J Exp Soc Psychol. 2009; 
45(4): 995-998. 
95. Cunningham WA, Brosch T. Motivational salience: Amygdala 
tuning from traits, needs, values, and goals. Curr Dir Psychol 
Sci. 2012; 21:54-59. 
96. Holzel BK, Carmody J, Evans KC, et al. Stress reduction corre-
lates with structural changes in the amygdala. Soc Cogn Af-
fect Neurosci. March 2010; 5(1):11-17. 
97. Schreiber D, Fonzo G, Simmons AN, et al. Red brain, blue 
brain: Evaluative processes differ in Democrats and Repub-
licans. PLoS 0ne. 2013; 8(2):e52970. 
98. Amodio DM, Jost JT, Master SL, Yee CM. Neurocognitive cor-
relates of liberalism and conservatism. Nat Neurosci. 2007; 
10:1246-1247. 
99. Ahn W-Y, Kishida Kenneth T, Gu X, et al. Nonpolitical images 
evoke neural predictors of political ideology. Curr Biol. 2014; 
24(22):2693-2699. 
100. Inbar Y, Pizarro DA, Bloom P. Conservatives are more easily 
disgusted than liberals. Cogn Emotion. 2009; 23(4):714-725. 
101. Tritt SM, Inzlicht M, Peterson JB. Preliminary support for a 
generalized arousal model of political conservatism. PLoS 
One. 2013; 8(12):e83333. 
102. Schwartz SH, Bilsky W. Toward a theory of the universal con-
tent and structure of values: Extensions and cross-cu1tural 
replications. J Pers Soc Psychol. 1990; 24:1-91. 
103. Jost JT. The end of the end of ideology. Am Psychol. 2006; 
61:651-670. 
104. Zamboni G, Gozzi M, Krueger F, Duhamel J-R, Sirigu A, Graf-
man J. Individualism, conservatism, and radicalism as crite-
ria for processing political beliefs: A parametric fMRI study. 
Soc Neurosci. October 1, 2009; 4(5):367-383. 
105. Dawes CT, Loewen PJ, Schreiber D, et al. Neural basis of 
egalitarian behavior. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. April 24, 2012; 
109(17): 6479-6483. 
106. Converse PE. The nature of belief systems in mass publics. 
In: Apter DE, ed. Ideology and Discontent. New York: Free 
Press;  1964:206-261. 
107. Gozzi M, Zamboni G, Krueger F, Grafman J. Interest in politics 
modulates neural activity in the amygdala and ventral stria-
tum. Hum Brain Mapp. November 2010; 31(11):1763-1771. 
108. Berkman ET, Cunningham WA, Uebennan MD. Research 
methods in social and affective neuroscience. In: Reis HT, 
Judd CM, eds. Handbook of Research Methods in Personal-
ity and Social Psychology. 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press;  2014:123-158. 
